Durch Gesellschaft und Kultur geprägte Geschlechtsidentität einer Person in Abgrenzung zu ihrem biologischen Geschlecht. (OWID)

[1935
If those temperamental attitudes which we have traditionally regarded as feminine—such as passivity, responsiveness, and a willingness to cherish children—can so easily be set up as the masculine pattern in one tribe, and in another be outlawed for the majority of women as well as for the majority of men, we no longer have any basis for regarding such aspects of behaviour as sex-linked. And this conclusion becomes even stronger when we consider the actual reversal in Tchambuli of the position of dominance of the two sexes, in spite of the existence of formal patrilineal institutions. The material suggests that we may say that many, if not all, of the personality traits which we have called masculine or feminine are as lightly linked to sex as are the clothing, the manners, and the form of head-dress that a society at a given period assigns to either sex. When we consider the behaviour of the typical Arapesh man or woman as contrasted with the behaviour of the typical Mundugumor man or woman, the evidence is overwhelmingly in favour of the strength of social conditioning.
Margaret Mead: Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies, London 1935, S. 279f.]

1945
In the grade-school years, too, gender (which is the socialized obverse of sex) is a fixed line of demarcation, the qualifying terms being ‘feminine’ and ‘masculine’. Many matters in grouping, playing, exercising, reciting, and the like, separate the boys from the girls.  That these are social matters of gender may be demonstrated by a reference across to the domestic animals, where there is sex but no gender, sex which has its occasional demonstrations and signals but exerts little other influence upon the cattle, the horses, the cats and the chickens. There can be no doubt that the gendering of the younger child sets a definite stamp upon it and distinctly contributes to its general socialization.
Madison Bentley: Sanity and hazard in childhood, in: The American Journal of Psychology 58 (1945), S. 212-246, hier S. 228.

1950
It [sc. Margaret Mead’s Male and Female] informs the reader upon ‘gender’ as well as upon ‘sex’, upon masculine and feminine rôles as well as upon male and female and their reproductive functions.
M. B. [Madison Bentley]: Brief comment upon recent books, in: The American Journal of Psychology 63 (1950), S. 310-316, hier S. 312.

1955
The case of contradiction between gonadal sex and sex of rearing are tabulated in Table II, together with data on endogenous hormonal sex and gender role. The term gender role is used to signify all those things that a person says or does to disclose himself or herself as having the status of boy or man, girl or woman, respectively. It includes, but is not restricted to sexuality in the sense of eroticism. Of the 17 people represented in Table II, all but 3 disclosed themselves in the gender role fully concordant with their rearing though contradicted by their gonads. Gonadal structure per se proved a most unreliable prognosticator of a person’s gender role and orientation as man or woman; assigned sex proved an extremely reliable one.
John Money: Hermaphroditism, gender and precocity in hyperadrenocorticism: Psychologic findings, in: Bulletin of the Johns Hopkins Hospital 96 (1955), S. 253-264, hier S. 254.

1968
mental sexual characters […] we are now calling gender […]
one can speak of the male sex or the female sex, but one can also talk about masculinity and femininity and not necessarily be implying anything about anatomy or physiology. Thus, while sex and gender seem to common sense to be practically synonymous, and in everyday life to be inextricably bound together, one purpose of this study will be to confirm the fact that the two realms (sex and gender) are not at all inevitably bound in anything like a one-to-one relationship, but each may go in its quite independent way. […]
If the first main finding of this work is that gender identity is primarily learned, the second is that there are biological forces that contribute to this.
Robert Stoller: Sex and Gender. On the Development of Masculinity and Femininity, New York 1968, S. vi; vii; xi.

1971
It is still a question whether equality in a reasonable sense can at all be attained within a society that builds on a capitalist economy, and perhaps at all in a society which is not both socialist and above a certain level of technology. The interests of children as a group would be contradictory to, and heavily set aside under, a combination of market economy and gender equality. The practicality of full equality under the present economy must be questioned.
Harriet Holter: Sex Roles and Social Change, in: Acta Sociologica 14 (1971), S. 2-12, hier S. 10.

1974
[The] pseudo-sexual character of dominance-submission behavior suggests that gender inequality, which is present in most primates, and markedly so in terrestrial primates, has become a generalized model for other forms of inequality as well. Besides gender, the other fundamentally biological inequality in primates is, of course, age
Pierre L. van den Berghe: Bringing beasts back in: toward a biosocial theory of aggression, in: American Sociological Review 39 (1974), S. 777-788, hier S. 780.

1976
the authors suggest that gender inequality is prior to class inequality, and that all inequality is maintained by primary socialization into the inegalitarian, patriarchal nuclear family.
Daphne Phillips: [Review: Solomon Encel und Norman Ian MacKenzie: Women and Society. An Australian Study, London 1975], in: Sociology 10 (1976), S. 168-169, hier S. 169.

1986
Consultative mechanisms through which the views of women may be incorporated in governmental activities should be set up, and supportive ties with women’s grass-roots organizations, such as self-help community development and mutual aid societies and non-governmental organizations committed to the cause of women should be created and maintained to facilitate the integration of woman in mainstream development. […]  Governments should compile gender-specific statistics and information and should develop or reorganize an information system to take decisions and action on the advancement of women.
Report of the World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace, Nairobi, 15-26 July 1985, New York 1986, S. 33f.

1990
To expose the foundational categories of sex, gender, and desire as effects of a specific formation of power requires a form of critical inquiry that Foucault, reformulating Nietzsche, designates as “genealogy.” A genealogical critique refuses to search for the origins of gender, the inner truth of female desire, a genuine or authentic sexual identity that repression has kept from view; rather, genealogy investigates the political stakes in designating as an origin and cause those identity categories that are in fact the effects of institutions, practices, discourses with multiple and diffuse points of origin. The task of this inquiry is to center on—and decenter—such defining institutions: phallogocentrism and compulsory heterosexuality. […]
The presumption of a binary gender system implicitly retains the belief in a mimetic relation of gender to sex whereby gender mirrors sex or is otherwise restricted by it. When the constructed status of gender is theorized as radically independent of sex, gender itself becomes a free-floating artifice, with the consequence that man and masculine might just as easily signify a female body as a male one, and woman and feminine a male body as easily as a female one. This radical splitting of the gendered subject poses yet another set of problems. Can we refer to a “given” sex or a “given” gender without first inquiring into how sex and/or gender is given, through what means? And what is “sex” anyway? Is it natural, anatomical, chromosomal, or hormonal, and how is a feminist critic to assess the scientific discourses which purport to establish such “facts” for us? Does sex have a history? Does each sex have a different history, or histories? Is there a history of how the duality of sex was established, a genealogy that might expose the binary options as a variable construction? Are the ostensibly natural facts of sex discursively produced by various scientific discourses in the service of other political and social interests? If the immutable character of sex is contested, perhaps this construct called “sex” is as culturally constructed as gender; indeed, perhaps it was always already gender, with the consequence that the distinction between sex and gender turns out to be no distinction at all. […]
As a shifting and contextual phenomenon, gender does not denote a substantive being, but a relative point of convergence among culturally and historically specific sets of relations. […]
there is no possibility of agency or reality outside of the discursive practices that give those terms the intelligibility that they have. The task is not whether to repeat, but how to repeat or, indeed, to repeat and, through a radical proliferation of gender, to displace the very gender norms that enable the repetition itself. There is no ontology of gender on which we might construct a politics, for gender ontologies always operate within established political contexts as normative injunctions, determining what qualifies as intelligible sex, invoking and consolidating the reproductive constraints on sexuality, setting the prescriptive requirements whereby sexed or gendered bodies come into cultural intelligibility. Ontology is, thus, not a foundation, but a normative injunction that operates insidiously by installing itself into political discourse as its necessary ground. The deconstruction of identity is not the deconstruction of politics; rather, it establishes as political the very terms through which identity is articulated. This kind of critique brings into question the foundationalist frame in which feminism as an identity politics has been articulated. The internal paradox of this foundationalism is that it presumes, fixes, and constrains the very “subjects” that it hopes to represent and liberate. The task here is not to celebrate each and every new possibility qua possibility, but to redescribe those possibilities that already exist, but which exist within cultural domains designated as culturally unintelligible and impossible.
Judith Butler: Gender Trouble. Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, New York 1990, S. ix; 6; 10; 148f.

1999
Mainstreaming a gender perspective is the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality.
United Nations: Report of the Economic and Social Council for the Year 1997, Generl Assembly, Official Records, Fifty-second Session, Suppl. No. 3 (A/52/3/Rev. 1), New York 1999, S. 24; https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/271316.

2013
In seiner am meisten verbreiteten Form bezeichnet der Terminus „Gender“ […] den kulturellen Unterschied zwischen Frauen und Männern auf der Grundlage der biologischen Teilung zwischen männlich und weiblich. Dichotomie und Unterscheidung sind der Kern dieser Vorstellung. Männer sind vom Mars, Frauen sind von der Venus. […]
Es gibt für die Gender-Prozesse keine feste „biologische Grundlage“. Was es gibt, ist eine Arena, in der Körper in soziale Prozesse einbezogen werden, in der unser soziales Verhalten mit der reproduktiven Differenz etwas anstellt. Ich werde dies als die „reproduktive Arena“ bezeichnen. Dies erlaubt es uns, Geschlecht so zu definieren, dass die Paradoxien der Differenz aufgelöst werden. Geschlecht ist die Struktur sozialer Beziehungen, in deren Zentrum die reproduktive Arena steht, und die Anzahl von Praktiken, die reproduktive Unterschiede zwischen Körpern in soziale Prozesse hinein bringen. Informell gesagt geht es bei Gender um die Art und Weise, wie die menschliche Gesellschaft menschliche Körper und ihre Kontinuität behandelt sowie die vielen Konsequenzen, die sich aus dieser „Behandlung“ für unser persönliches Leben und unser kollektives Schicksal ergeben.
Raewyn Connell: Gender, Wiesbaden 2013, S. 28; 29f.

2017
Gender ist nicht nur eine konstruierbare, sondern auch eine dekonstruierbare, verhandelbare Größe. Zumindest in einem Punkt herrscht heute Konsens: Frauen und Männer sind nicht einfach als Frauen und Männer geboren; sie werden es im Verlauf ihrer unterschiedlichen Sozialisation. Kulturelles wie biologisches Geschlecht entstehen laufend performativ, das heißt sex und gender werden im entsprechenden Handeln erst hergestellt.
Therese Frey Steffen: Gender, Stuttgart 2017, S. 21.

2020
Gender (engl.), soziales Geschlecht, wird in der Geschlechterforschung dem Begriff sex als (vermeintlich biologisch gegebenem) Geschlechtskörper gegenübergestellt. G. verweist darauf, dass Geschlechtsidentitäten wie Weiblichkeit und Männlichkeit nicht angeboren sind. Vielmehr sind sie ein Produkt spezifischer sozio-kultureller, historischer Konstruktionen (Geschlechtskonstruktion), die in jedem Moment des Alltagshandels interaktiv hergestellt werden müssen (doing gender). „Wir werden nicht als Frauen geboren, sondern dazu gemacht“ (S. de Beauvoir 1949). Nach der Historikerin J. Scott (1988) hat v. a. J. Butler (1991; 1995) sex, die Existenz eines ahistorischen, universell gegebenen Sexualkörpers, als einen Effekt diskursiver Praktiken dechiffriert. Die biologische und soziale Geschlechterdifferenz, die geschlechtsspezifische Arbeitsteilung, Geschlechtsidentitäten, Geschlechternormen und -wahrnehmungen sind in historische und kulturell variable Macht-Wissen-Komplexe eingebunden.
Elisabeth Tuider: [Art.] Gender, in: Daniela Klimke et al. (Hg.): Lexikon zur Soziologie, 6. Aufl., Wiesbaden 2020, S. 260.

2020
Gender Mainstreaming (engl.), eine Strategie zur Förderung der Gleichstellung von Frauen und Männern. G.M. ist der Erkenntnis geschuldet, dass Frauen- und Gleichstellungspolitik nur dann zu langfristigen strukturellen Veränderungen beitragen kann, wenn Gleichstellung als Querschnittsthema aller Politik- und Arbeitsbereiche betrachtet wird. G.M. ist eine Doppelstrategie, d. h. alle Vorhaben werden auf ihre geschlechtsspezifischen Wirkungen hin überprüft und so gestaltet, dass sie einen Beitrag zur Förderung der Gleichstellung von Frauen und Männern leisten. Darüber hinaus sollen spezifische Förderprogramme weiterhin gezielt den Abbau von Ungleichheit beschleunigen. G.M. wurde auf der 3. UN-Weltfrauenkonferenz in Nairobi (1985) als politische Strategie vorgestellt und auf der 4. Weltfrauenkonferenz in Peking (1995) beschlossen. In der EU ist G.M. u. a. im Amsterdamer Vertrag festgeschrieben und damit auch für die Mitgliedsstaaten rechtsverbindlich.
Uta Klein: [Art.] Gender Mainstreaming, in: Daniela Klimke et al. (Hg.): Lexikon zur Soziologie, 6. Aufl., Wiesbaden 2020, S. 260.